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"That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source
and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes."1
INTRODUCTION
Wendy Weaver taught psychology and physical education and
coached volleyball for nineteen years at Spanish Fork High School in
the predominantly Mormon community of Nebo, Utah.2 Ms. Weaver
received tenure after her fourth year of teaching and had never
received any disciplinary action in all her years of teaching.' No one
questioned her ability to do these jobs well-until the spring and
1. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
2. Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1280 (D. Utah 1998); see also
Lesbian Coach Fighting Ouster by School District, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Oct.
22, 1997, at A8 (describing the Spanish Fork community as "conservative" and "mostly
Mormon").
3. Weaver, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1280.
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summer of 1997, when many members of the Nebo community
learned that Ms. Weaver is a lesbian.4 The subject of Ms. Weaver's
sexual orientation was first raised with the school principal and school
district administrators by Ms. Weaver's ex-husband, who also worked
for the school district, and other unidentified callers.5 The only time
that Ms. Weaver discussed her own sexuality with anyone in the
school community was in a phone call to a volleyball team member
about summer volleyball camp. The high school senior asked her
teacher, "Are you gay?" Ms. Weaver responded simply, "Yes."
6
That student and her parents called the principal and later met with
district officials to inform them that the student was uncomfortable
and would no longer play on the volleyball team because the coach
was gay.7
School district officials decided to take action against Ms.
Weaver for commenting on her sexual orientation, so in the summer
of 1997 the principal informed her that she would not be coaching the
volleyball team that year.8 The next day, district officials called her in
and presented her with a letter ordering her not to speak to any
students, staff members, or parents regarding her "homosexual
orientation or lifestyle," even in response to direct questions.9 This
letter was placed in her personnel file.1"
Ms. Weaver challenged the district's action in federal district
court as a vague and overbroad restraint on her constitutionally
protected speech.11 Although she won a resounding victory on the
First Amendment issue, she was then forced to defend herself against
a lawsuit filed by a group of parents and former students who called
themselves "Citizens of Nebo School District for Moral and Legal
Values.""2  The second suit, dismissed by the courts for lack of





9. Id. at 1281-82.
10. Id. (noting that a similar letter was delivered to her ex-husband, a school
psychologist, ordering him not to talk to anyone about his ex-wife's sexual orientation).
11. Id. at 1282.
12. See Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 601 (Utah 2003) (affirming the district court's
dismissal for lack of standing of a complaint against Weaver and the board of education
brought by parents and former students charging she was an unfit teacher). The claims
that made it to appellate review alleged that Weaver administered personality tests in her
psychology class, discussed dream interpretation, criticized the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, and encouraged students to question authority and "determine for
themselves whether 'alternative lifestyles' are right or wrong." Id. at 593. The Utah
Supreme Court determined that there was no private right of action under Utah law
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standing, charged that Ms. Weaver was an unfit teacher for several
reasons, including because she was a lesbian and therefore was
violating state laws against sodomy and engaging in immoral activities
unbecoming a teacher. 3
Although Ms. Weaver's willingness to fight this restraint in court
may have garnered her more publicity than other teachers in similar
situations, her experience was far from unique. Many other
employers and communities continue to punish gay or lesbian
teachers for not staying closeted. 4  For example, in 1996, the
Williamsburg, Ohio, School Board chose not to renew the teaching
contract of elementary school teacher Bruce Glover after an
unidentified caller reported to school administrators that she had
seen Glover holding hands with his male partner at a school holiday
party. 5 Also in 1996, members of the Grand Rapids, Michigan,
community discovered that a high school music teacher, Gerry Crane,
was gay, and waged a campaign of harassment against Mr. Crane that
included pulling their children from his classes, distributing fliers in
church parking lots about the "sodomite music teacher," and mailing
concerning the competence or ethical conduct of a teacher. Id. at 598; see also Hilary
Groutage, Judge Limits Claims in Suit Against Embattled Lesbian Teacher, but Lets Two
Issues Stand, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 17, 1999, at Al. (reporting that the district court
judge dismissed seven of nine counts in the complaint, including claims that Weaver
violated parental rights protected by the state constitution and that she violated state
teacher certification laws by committing sodomy and living with her same-sex partner);
Elizabeth Neff, High Court Awards Round to Teacher, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 5, 2003, at
B1 (reporting that the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the lawsuit, saying parents must
take their claims to the State education agency).
13. See Neff, supra note 12; see also Kirsten Sorenson, Group Takes Stand Against
Lesbian Teacher, Board, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Nov. 12, 1998, at B3
(describing parents' argument that Weaver is morally unfit because she is a lesbian).
14. This Comment uses the term "gay" to describe teachers identifying themselves as
gay, lesbian, and bisexual. Although some of the conclusions herein may apply to
transgender and transsexual individuals as well, they face different challenges in seeking
public employment, including discrimination based more on appearance than expression,
and thus require a more specialized analysis that is beyond the scope of this piece. For a
discussion of the new area of litigation involving rights of transsexuals and transvestites,
see generally Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Law in Providing Education: School Board
Control Over Education and a Teacher's Right to Privacy, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV.
609, 611-12 (2004) (discussing new area of litigation involving rights of transsexuals and
transvestites). See also Ashlie v. Chester-Upland Sch. Dist., No. 78-4037, 1979 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12516, at *13 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1979) (finding against a junior high school art
teacher who had a sex change operation over the summer and was fired upon her return;
the court found that while private sexual behavior is not an appropriate consideration in a
teacher's fitness, a sex change is by nature a public action).
15. See Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160,1164 (S.D. Ohio
1998). The rumor turned out to be false, but none of the administrators involved
investigated its truth before making their employment decision. Id.
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videos about the evils of homosexuality to all the families whose
children were in Crane's classes.16 Far from protecting Crane, the
Grand Rapids School Board issued a statement condemning
homosexuality and stating that Crane would be "closely watched."' 7
Mr. Crane eventually chose to resign with a settlement18 from the
school board rather than do battle in court.19
Although public acceptance of gay citizens has increased in
recent decades, 20 these anecdotes reveal that school administrators in
some communities still face strong incentives to keep gay teachers in
the closet for fear of community reaction. 2' This Comment argues
that, despite those concerns, the First Amendment prevents the state
from pressuring gay teachers to remain closeted. Part I of this
Comment gives a brief overview of the legal and social history of gay
Americans in public employment. Part II addresses teachers' speech
about their sexual orientation outside the classroom setting, by
combining the First Amendment jurisprudence that has developed
specifically for public school teachers with new developments in the
law's attitude toward homosexuals. Part II concludes that teachers'
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression should protect
their out-speech in the workplace as well as in the community. Part
III examines the separate line of precedent covering teachers' speech
in the classroom setting, and finds that while schools may have
greater control over teachers' expression within the classroom, they
must exercise that control through viewpoint neutral policies.
16. 20/20: Please Don't Teach Our Kids (ABC television broadcast Mar. 13, 1998),
available at LEXIS, ABC News transcripts no. 98031303-j99; see also Christine Yared,
Where are the Civil Rights for Gay and Lesbian Teachers?, HUM. RTS., Summer 1997, at 22
(describing Crane's ordeal and fight to retain his job).
17. 20/20, supra note 16.
18. Id.
19. Yared, supra note 16, at 22. Crane died of an apparent stress-induced heart attack
soon after his resignation. Id.; see also Tracy Dell'Angela, Gay Educators Discovering
Strength in Honesty, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 2000, at N1 (discussing Crane's resignation and
death).
20. See, e.g., Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 251 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2001)
(describing Chicago public schools' decision to extend benefits to same-sex partners of
teachers, in order to recruit gay teachers to the district); Jamie Malernee & Peter Bernard,
Teacher Tackles Tough Issues, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 1, 2002, at 1B
(describing the story of a Florida elementary school teacher who thanked her same-sex
partner during her Teacher of the Year acceptance speech).
21. See Dell'Angela, supra note 19 (discussing education as "a profession that remains
deeply closeted" and noting that "gay teachers face enormous pressures to lie about their
private lives" for fear of losing their jobs and facing protests and alienation from parents,
colleagues, and students).
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I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: GAYS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
The first high-profile cases regarding the rights of gays in public
employment emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s, in the wake of the
sexual revolution and the beginning of a strong cultural backlash that
targeted homosexuals in all aspects of public life.22 Bias against
homosexuals was by no means limited to small towns or conservative
state capitals; until the early 1970s, the personnel manual of the
United States Civil Service Commission contained the following
language: "Homosexuality and Sexual Perversion: Persons about
whom there is evidence that they have engaged in or solicited others
to engage in homosexual or sexually perverted acts with them,
without evidence of rehabilitation, are not suitable for federal
employment."23
In 1969, the D.C. Circuit set a precedent of distinguishing
between homosexual status and public homosexual conduct when it
held that the Federal Civil Service Commission could not dismiss
employees for private homosexual conduct without some showing
that the conduct had impaired the efficiency of the Service.24
However, the court suggested several ways in which private
homosexual activity by an employee might impair an agency,
including the potential for blackmail, providing evidence of an
"unstable personality," and, "if his conduct is notorious," causing
disruptions because of the reactions of other employees or the
public.25
In 1976, the Ninth Circuit seized on this reasoning in Singer v.
United States Civil Service Commission.2 6 John Singer was a typist in
the Seattle office of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and when he was hired he informed his employer that
he was gay.27 Almost a year after he was hired, he was called before
22. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
23. Singer v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 254 n.12 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated
429 U.S. 1034 (1977). In 1973, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California found that the Commission could discharge employees under this section
only if the behavior actually affected the efficiency of the agency. Id. at 254 (citing Soc'y
for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973)).
24. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Norton was a budget
analyst for NASA; a morals squad arrested and interrogated him in the middle of the
night after seeing him pick up a man from the curb, drive around the block, and then drop
him off again. Id. at 1163. The morals squad then called NASA and turned him over to
his employer for additional interrogation and eventual termination on the grounds of
having made a "homosexual advance." Id. at 1162-63.
25. Id. at 1166.
26. 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976).
27. Id. at 248.
2006]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
an investigative commission to respond to charges that he "flaunted"
his sexuality by allegedly kissing a man at a previous workplace,
giving an interview to the San Francisco Chronicle in which he
identified himself as homosexual, openly admitting to his sexuality,
and applying for a marriage license with another man. 8 The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit that a person could not be fired
from government employment for being a homosexual or engaging in
private homosexual activity, but held that by "openly and publicly
flaunting his homosexual way of life" Singer could lessen public
confidence in the government agency and thus impair its efficiency.29
This holding exemplifies the distinction between being gay and
"acting gay" that faces many gay citizens even after Romer v. Evans3
and Lawrence v. Texas.31
At the time of these decisions, the political atmosphere for gay
teachers in the public schools was even more hostile than that facing
other government employees. For example, in 1977, singer Anita
Bryant gained national publicity with her Save the Children
campaign, which was aimed at banning homosexuals from teaching in
public schools.32 Save the Children was successful in its campaign to
repeal the human rights ordinance of Dade County, Florida, which
prevented discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.33 Bryant,
a Miss America runner-up and the voice of Florida Orange Juice,
grounded her campaign in Biblical passages and dire warnings that
homosexuals would use teaching positions to recruit children and
possibly molest them.34  A 1978 California referendum, which was
28. Id. at 249.
29. Id. at 255.
30. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a Colorado amendment prohibiting all
legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexuals from
discrimination, violated equal protection).
31. 539 U.S. 558 (2004) (holding a Texas sodomy statute unconstitutional as applied
to adult men engaging in consensual acts in the privacy of their own home); see, e.g., Kenji
Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 15, 2006, at 32, 34-35 (exploring
the "new discrimination" in the form of pressure on homosexuals and other minorities to
avoid actions and appearances that openly proclaim their minority status).
32. See Tom Mathews, Battle Over Gay Rights, NEWSWEEK, June 6, 1977, at 16, 16-17
(describing Bryant's campaign rhetoric and its effect beyond Florida); see also Phil
McCombs, Anita Bryant Visit Here Sparks Demonstration, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1978, at
C1 (discussing Bryant's depictions of homosexuals and large-scale protests provoked by
her appearance at a Washington, D.C. convention).
33. Richard Steele & Holly Camp, A 'No' to the Gays, NEWSWEEK, June 20, 1977, at
27, 27-30 (describing the defeat of the Dade County human rights ordinance by a wide
margin as a "stunning setback for gay activists").
34. See Mathews, supra note 32, at 16 (Bryant "feared that homosexuals would use
the schools to influence children in favor of homosexuality or perhaps even to molest
them"); Denise A. Williams, Homosexuals: Anita Bryant's Crusade, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 11,
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only narrowly defeated, would have banned gays and lesbians from
teaching in the State's public schools." And in 1984, the Oklahoma
legislature enacted a statute allowing schools to fire or refuse to hire
teachers who had been rendered unfit by means of engaging in
"public homosexual activity."36 Some state courts, perhaps under the
influence of this political outcry, as well as their judicial view of the
unique role of schoolteachers in society, showed themselves even less
tolerant than the Singer court. Appellate courts in two states in the
late 1970s found homosexuality to be a proper basis for firing a
teacher under the state's "immorality" clause3 7 and for ordering a
teacher to undergo a mental health examination.38
In the almost thirty years since Anita Bryant's campaign,
American attitudes toward homosexuality and gay people have
undergone a sea change in many areas. For example, gay characters
have become, if not uncontroversial, at least commonplace in popular
television shows and movies.39 In Broward County, Florida (which
borders Dade County), the 2003 Teacher of the Year used her
acceptance speech to thank her longtime same-sex partner, a fellow
teacher at the same middle school.4" Chicago public school
authorities recently went to court to defend their decision to extend
same-sex benefits to teachers and their partners, in part in order to
attract gay teachers to serve as role models.4'
1977, at 39, 39-40 ("As a Miss America runner-up, a popular singer billed as 'the voice
that refreshes,' and the symbol of Florida orange juice, Anita Bryant has projected an
image of devout wholesomeness for nearly two decades.").
35. See California Referendums; Witch-Hunting, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 1978, at 50, 50.
36. See Nat'l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d 1270, 1272-74
(10th Cir. 1984) (finding that the part of the statute that prohibits public homosexual
"conduct" is overbroad and infringes upon constitutionally protected speech, although the
part that prohibits public homosexual "activity" does not violate the Constitution).
37. See Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist., 559 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wash. 1977).
38. See Gish v. Bd. of Educ., 366 A.2d 1337, 1342 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(per curiam) (holding that a school board acted rationally in determining that a teacher's
decision to assume the presidency of the New Jersey Gay Activists Alliance displayed
evidence of deviation from normal mental health, and ordering him to undergo psychiatric
examination).
39. See, e.g., Walt Belcher, 'Will & Grace' Leaves Behind a More Accepting America,
TAMPA TRIB., May 18, 2006, at 1 (discussing the last episode of the television show that
"pushed the boundaries of how gay characters are portrayed on broadcast network
television"); Bob Fischbach, 'Brokeback Mountain' About Love, Not Sex, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Dec. 18, 2005, at 1AT (describing possible Midwestern reception for
film featuring gay cowboys, and noting that "Middle America has more than tolerated gay
characters on hit television shows").
40. Malernee & Bernard, supra note 20.
41. See Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 251 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding
the school board's decision to offer same-sex partner benefits against equal protection and
2006]
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Federal courts have also made strides in recognizing the rights of
gay citizens. Between 1967 and 1984, the United States Supreme
Court refused to hear arguments on any cases about gay rights.42
Finally, in 1996, the Court recognized gays as a political and social
group in Romer v. Evans.3 In Romer, the Court invalidated on equal
protection grounds a state statute that prohibited municipalities from
passing ordinances to protect the rights of homosexuals." The Romer
opinion announced that mere animosity against homosexuals cannot
serve as a rational basis for state action.45 Most recently, in Lawrence
v. Texas,4 the Court struck down state sodomy statutes as an invasion
of privacy rights, ending the specter of criminal prosecutions of
homosexuals.47
Nonetheless, in many communities across the country, anti-gay
sentiment has become particularly focused on school teachers. In a
2001 Gallup Poll, although 85% of respondents agreed that
homosexuals should have equal access to job opportunities in general,
33% felt that gays should not be allowed to be high school teachers,
and 40% said that they should be barred from teaching elementary
school." Justice Scalia likely spoke for many of these Americans
when he wrote in his Lawrence v. Texas dissent that "[m]any
Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual
conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their
children, [or] as teachers in their children's schools., 49  The South
Carolina Republican Party echoed this statement in the 2004
elections when the party platform advocated banning openly gay men
and women from teaching in the State's public schools.5" In addition
due process challenges by a teacher who lived with an unmarried partner of the opposite
sex, and thus did not qualify for partner benefits).
42. Christopher R. Leslie, The Importance of Lawrence in the Context of the Supreme
Court's Historical Treatment of Gay Litigants, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 189, 210 (2005).
When the Supreme Court finally did hear a civil rights case brought by a gay plaintiff, in
1986, the result was a further setback in the campaign for basic gay rights: the Court
upheld a state law criminalizing sodomy against due process and equal protection
challenges. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
43. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
44. Id. at 635-36.
45. Id. at 634.
46. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
47. Id. at 578-79.
48. Anne Wagner, Poll Track, 33 NAT'L J. 1759, 1759 (2001).
49. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Schuyler Kropf, Gays Want DeMint to Apologize, POST COURIER (Charleston,
S.C.), Oct. 5, 2004, at B1 (discussing one candidate who openly agreed with this platform
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to community opposition to gay teachers, school officials may face
pressure from national advocacy groups."' In this atmosphere, it is
not surprising that administrators and school boards may desire that
gay teachers stay closeted in the communi'ty as well as in the
classroom. As outlined below, however, becoming a public school
teacher does not require giving up one's First Amendment right to
freedom of expression, even if some in the community may disagree
with what the teacher has to say.
II. OUT-SPEECH OUTSIDE THE CLASSROOM
This Part analyzes the application of First Amendment
jurisprudence to out-speech by teachers that does not take place in
the classroom, but somehow becomes known within the school
community. Sections A and B discuss the foundation of First
Amendment protections for teachers and students, Tinker v. Des
Moines,52 and subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing specifically
with teacher speech. Section C then outlines the use of Supreme
Court precedent in existing cases involving teacher out-speech and
their use of Supreme Court precedent. Finally, Section D argues that
federal courts have misapplied Supreme Court precedent regarding
First Amendment protection for teachers' public criticism of the
schools to cases of out-speech. The misuse of these cases has resulted
in a tangled and illogical process for what should be a straightforward
First Amendment analysis.
First Amendment jurisprudence often involves drawing clear
lines: certain expressive conduct or spaces for expression are
protected from government regulation, others are not.53 Regulating
the speech of state employees, however, requires special balancing
because the state acts as both government and as employer. The
Supreme Court has long recognized that the state has special interests
in a televised debate); see also Editorial, Leave Gay Teachers Alone, HERALD (Rock Hill,
S.C.), Oct. 7, 2004, at 7A (discussing the platform and one Senate candidate's response).
51. See David R. Anderson, School Chief Draws High Marks: Beaverton
Superintendent Jerry Colonna Ends His First Year With a Push for Literacy and
Leadership, and a Long List of Goals, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), July 1, 2004, at 1
(noting that when the Beaverton, Oregon superintendent faced a controversy over a
proposal to bring "a national photo exhibit on family diversity that included images of
same-sex parents" to the Beaverton schools, a radical anti-gay group from Kansas sent out
press releases attacking him).
52. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
53. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 952-1082 (2002) (delineating categories of speech that receive little or no
protection under the First Amendment).
2006]
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in regulating the speech of its employees that it does not have in
regulating other citizens, because of its need to promote the efficient
administration of government and maintain public confidence in its
agencies.54 On the other hand, state employees are still citizens, and
may not be required to give up their fundamental right to free speech
in order to secure government employment."
An even narrower branch of First Amendment jurisprudence
governs attempts to regulate the speech of public school teachers.
The state's interest in regulating speech is arguably even stronger for
teachers than other government employees, because teachers perform
a long-recognized special role in society as role models and purveyors
of society's values.56 Nonetheless, both teachers and students retain
some level of freedom of speech and expression when they enter the
54. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (finding that "the State has
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
general ... [including] promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees"); see also Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1102 (11th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing that the government may have different interests as an employer than it does
as a sovereign).
55. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (holding that "a State cannot
condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally
protected interest in freedom of expression"); see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (confirming that the Court had emphatically overturned previous
precedent allowing school authorities to set conditions of employment that infringed on
freedom of expression or association). It was not always this way; before 1961, the
Supreme Court saw public employment as a privilege, not a right, and thus subject to
"reasonable regulations" even though such regulations might infringe upon fundamental
rights of employees. See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (holding that
people have the right to free association, but they have no right to work for the state; if
they do not like the conditions laid down, "they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and
associations and go elsewhere"); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950)
(holding that government employment is not property, nor is it a right, and thus it is not
subject to deprivation without due process); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E.
517 (Mass. 1892) (upholding the firing of a policeman for political comment; Justice
Holmes held that while a citizen has a right to speak out on politics, he does not have a
right to be a policeman). In 1961, the Court rejected this rights/privileges distinction in
favor of a balancing approach that weighed the rights of the employee against the interests
of the state as employer in restricting those rights. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
56. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979) ("[A] teacher serves as a
role model for ... students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their
perceptions and values. Thus, through both the presentation of course materials and the
example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward
government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities."); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954) ("[Public education] is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values.., and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.").
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schoolhouse.57 Since the 1960s, federal courts have attempted, in a
long line of cases, to define the limits of First Amendment freedom of
speech for public school teachers.
A. The Foundation: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District"
The seminal Supreme Court case on free speech in the schools,
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, was a
product of the 1960s antiwar protest era. The plaintiffs in Tinker
were teenagers who chose to protest the Vietnam War by wearing
black armbands to their public schools.5 9 The principals of the
plaintiffs' schools responded by adopting a policy against armbands
and suspended the plaintiffs from school for violating the new rule.6°
The Supreme Court found that the students' right to free speech
under the First Amendment had been violated, and its opinion set a
new standard of freedom of expression in the schools with Justice
Fortas's now-famous pronouncement that "[i]t can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'
The Tinker decision highlighted the tension between the rights of
public officials to control conduct within the schools and the
fundamental freedoms of students and teachers. 62 The Court resolved
this tension by requiring that schools have good reason to censor
speech, beyond just "a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint "63 or
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance., 64  Under
57. See, for example, 1 RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST
AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 343-45 (2004), for an
overview of the Court's attempts to balance state authority over the schools with the
special need for First Amendment freedom in the educational environment.
58. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
59. Id. at 504.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 506. In fact, it could have been, and was, argued that teachers, at least,
could be required to shed certain rights, under the rights/privileges distinction employed
by the Court in state employment cases until 1961. See supra note 55.
62. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-07 ("[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need
for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent
with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools .... Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First
Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.").
63. Id. at 509.
64. Id. at 508. General references to censorship or restriction of teacher speech in this
Comment encompass both prior restraint on that speech, and to adverse employment
action taken in retaliation for certain speech perceived as objectionable. See, e.g., Perry v.
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Tinker, school authorities must justify censorship by showing that the
forbidden conduct would " 'materially and substantially interfere with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.' "65 This test set an important standard by recognizing that
students and teachers have important-but not unlimited-First
Amendment rights at school; however, it left questions about the
weight to be given to these competing interests, and how they might
differ when applied to teachers instead of students.66
While Tinker specifically involved student speech, the Court's
language encompassed teachers.67 However, it quickly became clear
that different issues arise when teachers, as employees, speak out in
the workplace. Therefore, the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board
of Education68 developed a new balancing test to determine when the
state may properly regulate or sanction a teacher's expressive
conduct.69
B. Private Expression by Teachers: Pickering and Connick
In 1968, the Township District Board of Education dismissed
Marvin Pickering, a high school teacher, after he sent a letter to the
editor of the local newspaper referring to a proposed tax increase.70
Pickering's letter criticized the board of education's past handling of
tax revenue and charged the superintendent with attempting to
silence teacher dissent.71 The board charged that Pickering's letter
damaged the reputation of board members and would foment conflict
and controversy in the school.72 The Illinois Supreme Court found
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598-603 (1972) (holding that if a public university declined to
renew a professor's employment contract in retaliation for constitutionally protected
speech, then it had violated his constitutional rights, even if he had no legitimate
"expectancy" of continued employment); see also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977) (following Perry v. Sindermann in this respect).
65. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)).
66. See Rodric B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free
Speech, 30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1999) (noting that the case-by-case balancing
required by Pickering and Connick created confusion for lower courts).
67. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (holding that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students
or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate" (emphasis added)).
68. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
69. Id. at 568.
70. Id. at 564.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 567.
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the board had ample support for its decision,73 but the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the State court had not given sufficient
protection to the teacher's First Amendment rights as a citizen, which
must be balanced against the State's interests as an employer.7 4
The Pickering test starts with the notion that teachers should
have the right of any citizen to speak out on matters of public
concern, unless that right is outweighed by the school system's
educational, disciplinary, and administrative interests.75 Pickering
creates a two-step analysis.76 First, does the speech in question touch
on a legitimate matter of public concern?" If the teacher is speaking
on a matter of public concern, then the second question is whether
the state's interest in its educational goals or maintaining order and
discipline in the schools outweighs the teacher's interest in free
78expression.
When the Court first formulated the "public concern" issue in
Pickering, the Justices did not spend much time outlining the type of
issues that constitute a public concern.79 Pickering's letter to the
73. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 225 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (II.
1967) (finding no First Amendment protection for teachers speaking out against their
employers and refusing to set aside the board's decision because it was not arbitrary or
capricious).
74. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 ("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.").
75. Id. at 571-72.
76. See Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying
Pickering as a two-step inquiry to a teacher's claim of retaliation for protected speech).
77. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983) (clarifying that the "public
concern" test is a threshold question implicit in Pickering); Cox, 790 F.2d at 672 (applying
Pickering as a two-step inquiry to a teacher's claim of retaliation for protected speech).
Whether certain speech touches on a matter of public concern is a question of law for the
court, not a factual determination. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1103 n.12 (11th Cir.
1997).
78. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73; see also Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1103 (applying
Pickering balancing test). The Court subsequently held in Mt. Healthy School District
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), that where the teacher's speech is
protected by the First Amendment, the teacher still bears the burden of proving that the
speech was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the decision to discipline him; the
burden then shifts to the administration to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
it would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected speech. Id. at 287.
This provides an opportunity for school boards to rehabilitate an otherwise
unconstitutional action by providing evidence of other wrongs by the teacher beside his
speech. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 1984)
(holding that if the school board had both permissible and constitutionally impermissible
reasons for taking disciplinary action against school personnel, under Mt. Healthy, the
disciplinary action could stand).
79. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
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editor regarded a bond issue that was the subject of public debate and
was slated to come before voters; on such a topic, the Court
proclaimed, "free - and open debate is vital to informed
decisionmaking by the electorate."8 Pickering's letter was a model of
speech on a matter of clear public concern, so it was not necessary to
parse the gray area between public concerns and private matters.81
In 1983, the Court took the opportunity in Connick v. Myers82 to
further explain and develop the "public concern" step of the
Pickering test.8 3 Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney in New
Orleans, developed concerns about some management decisions
made by her supervisors, so she distributed a questionnaire to her
coworkers in the district attorney's office about their level of
confidence in supervisors, whether they felt pressured to engage in
political campaigning, and other grievances.' Myers' supervisors
immediately terminated her for insubordination.85 The Supreme
Court held that Myers' conduct in distributing the questionnaire was
an extension of a private dispute between her and her supervisors,
and did not touch on a matter of public concern.86 If the employee's
speech does not touch on a matter of public concern, then the
restriction is treated as a private personnel matter, rather than a state
restriction on speech.87 The Court determined that because Sheila
Myers' questionnaire was not speech on a matter of public concern
the First Amendment was not implicated, and there was no need to
conduct further analysis.88 The dissent in Connick argued that these
were issues related to the performance of an elected public official
(the district attorney), and therefore were clearly of public concern.89
The majority disagreed, finding instead that the employer deserved
some latitude in regulating,such speech because "[t]o presume that all
matters which transpire within a government office are of public
80. Id. at 571-72.
81. Id.
82. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
83. Id. at 140.
84. Id. at 140-41.
85. Id. at 141.
86. Id. at 148.
87. Id. at 147.
88. Id. at 154.
89. Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is hornbook law ... that speech about the
manner in which government is operated or should be operated is an essential part of the
communications necessary for self-governance the protection of which was a central
purpose of the First Amendment." (internal quotations omitted)).
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concern would mean that virtually every remark ... would plant the
seed of a constitutional case."9
The Connick opinion adopted a narrow view of what constitutes
a "public concern," characterizing the speech in Pickering and its
antecedents and progeny as involving the right to participate in
politics and engage in expressive conduct "relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community."91 Subsequent to
Connick, however, many courts have erred more on the side of the
speaker in defining matters of public concern; the line that has been
drawn is essentially between personnel issues and internal workplace
disputes, and almost everything else.92 The internal operations of
public schools are arguably even more important to the public than in
other public offices such as the district attorney, due to the special
place schools occupy in the life of the community.93 This concept was
fundamental to the Pickering decision: the voters have an interest in
how their local schools are being managed, and teachers are
especially well situated to provide that information.94
Although Connick did not take place in the school context, it is
generally seen as a companion to Pickering and is applied to teachers
as well as any other state employee. Thus, most First Amendment
claims by public school teachers are decided using the two-step
90. Id. at 149 (majority opinion).
91. Id. at 144-46.
92. See, e.g., Altman v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 251 F.3d 1199, 1202 (8th Cir. 2001)
(finding that the way the corrections department dealt with the issue of gays in the
workplace "affects the performance of their public duties and is a matter of political and
social concern to the general public," and therefore employees' protests at a sensitivity
training seminar were speech on a matter of public concern); Tucker v. Cal. Dep't of
Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that "It]his circuit and other courts have
defined public concern speech broadly to include almost any matter other than speech that
relates to internal power struggles within the workplace" (emphasis omitted)); Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(observing that the distinction between public concern speech and nonpublic concern
speech "was between issues of external interest as opposed to ones of internal office
management" and that the term "public concern" refers "not to the number of interested
listeners or readers but to whether the expression relates to some issue of interest beyond
the employee's bureaucratic niche"), affd in part, rev'd in part, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
93. See supra note 56 (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition of the special role
of teachers as purveyors of society's values and morals).
94. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968).
95. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1984)
(applying Connick to find teacher's private speech not protected under Pickering "public
concern" test).
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Pickering-Connick test.96 First, the courts decide whether the speech
in question touched on a matter of public concern, as defined in
Connick. If it does not, the inquiry ends and the speech is not
protected by the First Amendment from state employer censorship or
retaliation. If the speech does touch on a matter of public concern,
then the court balances the employee's private interest in speaking
out with the employer's interest in controlling his or her speech.
C. Applications to Out-Speech
In subsequent decisions, courts have repeatedly applied the
Pickering-Connick test to free speech claims by gay civil servants, and
teachers in particular. For example, in Acanfora v. Board of
Education of Montgomery County97 the Fourth Circuit found public
advocacy by a gay teacher to be protected under Pickering, although
it still allowed the school to fire him.98 The Montgomery County,
Maryland, school system hired Joseph Acanfora as a junior high
school science teacher.99  A few weeks after school began the
administration discovered that Acanfora was a homosexual and in
college had been an active member of an organization called
"Homophiles of Penn State."'00 Acanfora was quickly transferred to
a position with no student contact. 1 1 During his appeal of the
decision to transfer him, Acanfora gave several media interviews
about his treatment by the school system.0 2
The Fourth Circuit found that Acanfora's membership in the
Homophiles organization and his subsequent media interviews about
the school system's handling of his homosexuality were a matter of
public concern under Pickering.°3 Specifically, the court held that
because these activities caused no disruption at school or impairment
of his teaching capacities, the school board's actions violated his First
Amendment rights and were not justified by Pickering."°
Nonetheless, the court found Acanfora lacked standing to challenge
his dismissal because his failure to list the homosexual organization
96. See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 510-14 (describing the mode of
inquiry into whether a teacher's speech is protected by the First Amendment, beginning
with Pickering and including Connick).
97. 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
98. Id. at 503-04.
99. Id. at 500.
100. Id. at 499-500.
101. Id. at 500.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 500-01.
104. Id.
316 [Vol. 85
OUT-SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
on his teaching application amounted to a lie, and estopped him from
challenging the constitutionality of the question on the application."'
Ten years later, the Tenth Circuit invalidated a state statute
governing teachers on grounds that it punished speech protected by
Pickering. In National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of
Oklahoma City,"°6 the Tenth Circuit struck down part of an
Oklahoma statute0 7 that allowed for punishment or dismissal of
teachers for "public homosexual conduct," which was defined as
"advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting public or
private homosexual activity."'0 8  The court found the statute was
overbroad to the extent that it punished speech that might be allowed
under Pickkring and Tinker. °9 The court pointed out that the First
Amendment protects public advocacy, even of illegal conduct (as
sodomy was at that time), as long as that advocacy is not "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action." ' 0
In addition to public advocacy, some courts have also applied
Pickering and Connick to out-speech by gay teachers that becomes
known in the school community, but would not be considered a public
statement in the same sense as a media interview. In the leading case
on this question, Rowland v. Mad River Local School District,"' the
Sixth Circuit declared that "coming out" was not a matter of public
concern.1 In Rowland, the school suspended, transferred to an
administrative position, and ultimately dismissed a guidance
counselor after she told administrators and coworkers, in private
conversations, that she was bisexual and had a female lover."3 The
jury found the decision to suspend her was motivated at least in part
by her statements regarding her bisexuality, and the trial judge
entered a verdict against the school board on both free speech and
equal protection grounds."4 Between Ms. Rowland's trial and the
school board's appeal before the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court
handed down Connick."5 Using Connick's public concern test, the
105. Id. at 504. Interestingly, the Montgomery County administrators admitted that
had Acanfora been honest on his application, they would not have hired him. Id. at 501.
106. 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984), affd by an equally divided court, 470 U.S. 903
(1985).
107. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-103.15 (West 2002) (repealed 1989).
108. Nat'l Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1274.
109. Id. at 1275.
110. Id. at 1274 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
111. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
112. Id. at 449.
113. Id. at 446.
114. Id. at 447.
115. Id. at 449 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)).
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Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's verdict, and found that Ms.
Rowland's statements were not protected by the First Amendment.'16
The court considered two types of evidence in determining that Ms.
Rowland's speech was not a matter of public concern: the content
and the context in which she spoke. " 7 The court found "[tihere was
absolutely no evidence of any public concern in the community or at
Stebbins High with the issue of bisexuality among school personnel
when she began speaking to others about her own sexual
preference." '118 Moreover, the court saw the fact that Ms. Rowland
had asked the school secretary to keep her disclosure of her
bisexuality in confidence as evidence of the nonpublic nature of her
speech. " 9
The result in Rowland could lead to the somewhat ironic
conclusion that a teacher would be more likely to find First
Amendment protection for public out-speech than for quiet
discussions with coworkers. If Ms. Rowland had written a letter to
the local newspaper about the school system's policy regarding the
employment of gay teachers and identified herself as bisexual in the
letter, a court applying Pickering would be almost certain to identify
this as speech on a matter of public concern.'2 ° Surely a school board
concerned with community disapproval of gay teachers would prefer
that its teachers not face this perverse incentive.
However, the Supreme Court has specifically held that an
employee's choice to express herself in one-on-one conversation,
rather than in a public declaration, does not preclude First
Amendment protection. In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
School District,2 ' a teacher faced dismissal after a series of private
encounters with her principal in which she criticized school district
policies and practices that she considered racist. 22 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that the teacher's speech was not protected under
Pickering because she expressed her concerns in private. 123  The
Supreme Court reversed, stating that its previous holdings "do not
support the conclusion that a public employee forfeits his protection




120. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968) (characterizing school
board policy as a matter of public concern, and one about which teachers as a class are
likely to be informed and have definite opinions).
121. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
122. Id. at 412-13.
123. Ayers v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1318 (5th Cir. 1977).
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against governmental abridgement of freedom of speech if he decides
to express his views privately rather than publicly.' ' 24 The Court did
note, however, that while a Pickering analysis of public speech
generally focuses on content alone, private expression may require
the consideration of the time, place, and manner of speech as well. 125
Taken together, therefore, the holdings in Rowland and Givhan lead
to the conclusion that, while a teacher will not be automatically
penalized for discussing her sexuality privately with her supervisors or
colleagues as opposed to announcing it publicly, her decision to keep
it quiet may be considered as evidence that it is not a matter of public
concern.
Lower courts have repeatedly used the Rowland approach,
applying Pickering and Connick to cases of retaliation against
expressions of nonheterosexual orientation. The most recent
example is the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Shahar v. Bowers.12 6
Robin Shahar accepted a job offer in the office of Georgia Attorney
General Michael Bowers after she graduated from law school. 27
When it became known in the office that Shahar was planning to wed
another woman, her offer was rescinded. 128  The court applied
Pickering and found that the State had a strong interest in not
allowing people who publicly did not support its laws (such as bans on
sodomy and gay marriage) to hold positions with the responsibility to
uphold those laws, and this State interest outweighed Shahar's
interest in engaging in constitutionally protected free expression of
her lesbianism.2 9 Because the court found for Shahar's employers in
124. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414; see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-87
(1987) (holding employee's disparaging comment about President Reagan to a coworker
touched on a matter of public concern).
125. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415 n.4; see also Schoen, supra note 66, at 15-16 (discussing
the impact of Givhan footnote 4).
126. 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see also Johnson v. Orr, 617 F. Supp. 170,
176 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (employing Pickering and Connick in a case challenging the military's
then-policy of automatically discharging homosexuals, to find that a soldier's letter to her
supervisor disclosing her homosexuality was not speech on a matter of public concern),
affd, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986).
127. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1100. Attorney General Bowers had just successfully
defended his State's sodomy laws before the Supreme Court. See Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
128. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1100-01. Shahar told her future employer that she would be
getting married before starting work, but the same-sex nature of the marriage came to his
attention after an attorney from the office ran into Shahar and her partner at a local
restaurant, where they were working on their wedding invitations. Id.
129. Id. at 1104-05. The precedential value of Shahar is called into question by the
subsequent decision in Lawrence v. Texas, because the Eleventh Circuit placed much
weight on Shahar's presumed difficulty in upholding and enforcing Georgia's sodomy
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the balancing test, it chose to assume without deciding that the
applicant's conduct in having such a wedding ceremony was protected
speech on a matter of public concern. 130
D. Pickering Is the Wrong Test for Out-Speech
The use of Pickering and Connick to analyze out-speech by
teachers can lead to absurd results, as demonstrated by the Rowland
case-the absurdity being that Ms. Rowland would apparently have
been protected by the First Amendment had she discussed her
sexuality in response to a reporter's queries, but was not protected
because she chose to discuss it privately.31 The post-Romer and post-
Lawrence era has not seen a new rash of gay teacher plaintiffs, so it is
impossible to have a clear idea of how most courts today might apply
or depart from the precedents of the 1970s and 1980s. This is in part
due to the nature of the problem of stifling free speech; when schools
are successful in preventing or punishing out-speech by teachers, the
result is silence. The continued existence of precedents like Rowland
may also discourage many gay teachers from bringing suit when their
employers censor or punish their self-expression. As the stories of
Gerry Crane and other teachers described in the Introduction
demonstrate, however, a lack. of widespread litigation should not be
interpreted as widespread tolerance of teacher out-speech by school
administrators.'32 The possibility that the teachers named in lawsuits
and news reports represent many more who have remained silent
laws, and the Lawrence decision held similar laws invalid. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-
79.
130. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1106 n.19 (stating that the court will assume a right in
order to proceed to the Pickering balancing test). More recently, a federal district court
judge in Utah applied Pickering to the case of Wendy Weaver, the teacher discussed in the
Introduction who brought a First Amendment claim after her private acknowledgements
of her sexuality led to public controversy and, eventually, action against her by her school
board. See Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1280 (D. Utah 1998). As will
be discussed in more detail below, see infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text, the court
in Weaver used the same Pickering test used in Rowland but came to the opposite
conclusion, finding that Ms. Weaver's revelations did touch upon a matter of public
concern and were protected by the First Amendment. However, this different result
further highlights how poor a tool Pickering is for analyzing private out-speech by
teachers. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
131. See also Johnson v. Orr, 617 F. Supp. 170, 176 (E.D. Cal..1985) (finding plaintiff
soldier's letter to her supervisor admitting her homosexuality was not a matter of public
concern).
132. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
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makes it all the more important that this area of First Amendment
jurisprudence be clarified.133
There are two ways to criticize the reasoning in Rowland and its
progeny. The first is that Rowland is incorrect because it ignores the
reality that, in today's society, a public school teacher's sexual
orientation is inherently a matter of public concern.' This approach
has some commonsense appeal, but it sets a problematic precedent by
relying on the community's reaction to the teacher's speech as a
measure of how much protection it should receive. The second and
more persuasive criticism is that Rowland and other cases fail because
they do not involve the type of facts that Pickering and Connick were
meant to cover in the first place. Pickering and Connick concerned
state employees who made statements meant to bring public attention
to some condition within a government agency, not statements of
private self-expression completely unrelated to the speaker's
government employ.
The first argument, that homosexuality is inherently a matter of
public concern under Pickering, was originally raised by Justice
Brennan in his dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
to the Rowland case.'35 Brennan recalled that Connick recognized
some issues as "inherently of public concern," such as racial
discrimination. 36 In Brennan's view, the current public debate on
homosexuality also falls into that category:
I think it impossible not to note that a similar public debate is
currently ongoing regarding the rights of homosexuals. The
fact of petitioner's bisexuality, once spoken, necessarily and
ineluctably involved her in that debate. Speech that "touches
upon" this explosive issue is no less deserving of constitutional
attention than speech relating to more widely condemned forms
of discrimination. 37
In other words, at least in the 1980s when Rowland was decided, any
statement about homosexuality automatically involved the speaker in
a larger public debate.
133. See Yared, supra note 16, at 22 (describing how Gerry Crane's public struggle
mirrors many private struggles and may lead some teachers to face increased anxiety and
choose to remain closeted).
134. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
135. Id. at 1012 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8 (1983)).
136. Id.
137. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Brennan's commonsense approach has resonated with at least
one federal judge, who relied on his argument in deciding the case of
Wendy Weaver, the teacher discussed in the Introduction.'38 Ms.
Weaver's homosexuality became a public controversy after it was
disclosed to certain administrators by another party and then
confirmed in a private conversation between teacher and student.139
Ms. Weaver's case involved just the type of situation of concern to
Brennan in his dissent: a teacher who discussed her sexual
orientation only in private conversation, and only in response to
direct questioning from a student and administrators, and yet whose
school and community turned those private revelations into a public
controversy.140 In finding that the administrators' memo requiring
Ms. Weaver not to speak of her orientation violated her First
Amendment rights, the district court relied principally on Brennan's
Rowland dissent:
[I]t could be said that a voluntary "coming out" 'or an
involuntary "outing" of a gay, lesbian, or bisexual teacher
would always be a matter of public concern. Indeed, the public
reaction in the Nebo School District to the rumors about Ms.
Weaver's sexual orientation clearly evidence public concern
over her sexual orientation.141
The Weaver opinion also referenced a recent public debate in
Utah concerning the sexual orientation of a candidate for state
legislature as evidence that, at least in Utah, questions of sexual
orientation are almost always a matter of public concern. 142 Thus, the
social reality on which Brennan relied in 1985 had not changed
significantly by the time Ms. Weaver arrived in federal court more
than a decade later.
138. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text (discussing Ms. Weaver's story).
139. See Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1281 (D. Utah 1998).
140. For a discussion of the. Weaver fact pattern, see supra notes 1-13 and
accompanying text.
141. Weaver, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 (citing Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1012 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
142. Id. at 1284 n.3. In addition, the court found for Ms. Weaver under the Pickering
balancing test, because the school could show no evidence of material and substantial
disruption of the school's operations or educational mission. Id. at 1284-85. Although the
Nebo School District did not appeal beyond the district court level, at least one Tenth
Circuit judge has approved of the district court's holding in Weaver. See Maldonado v.
Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1323 (10th Cir. 2006) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (discussing a suit by Hispanic city employees challenging a policy that required
them to speak English and arguing that plaintiffs' use of Spanish proclaimed their
identities and involved them in an ongoing public debate about "diversity in America and
linguistic integration").
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The merits of Brennan's approach are manifold. First, it simply
recognizes a current social reality in which homosexuality and the
homosexual lifestyle are hot topics in a wider cultural battle. Second,
it recognizes the logical inference that if a community is concerned
about the content of a teacher's speech, then it is a matter of public
concern, whether or not it was initially intended as a private
disclosure. Third, it prevents teachers from being punished for the
indiscretion of school district personnel in handling sensitive
inforimation, as Ms. Rowland was when her requests for
confidentiality were disregarded by her coworkers.
The drawback of this approach, however, is that First
Amendment protection for out-speech still depends on the
community's reaction to that speech, and specifically on a court
finding public concern about the sexual orientation of teachers in a
certain community)43 In other words, the idea of an inherent public
concern is subject to social change and the subjective impressions of
judges. Brennan penned his Rowland dissent more than twenty years
ago; today, while it would still apply in the communities where
Wendy Weaver and Gerry Crane worked, a court in another
community could find that school administrators censored a teacher's
out-speech without evidence of public concern about the issue.'"
And yet, the changing landscape of social acceptance does not
prevent teachers in certain communities from being silenced, by
public protest in some instances, but perhaps also by over-cautious or
prejudiced school administrators.
The difficulty of maneuvering within the Pickering-Connick
"public concern" test when it comes to private coming-out speech
should lead to a reexamination of the entire approach. The facts of
Pickering, and the way in which the Supreme Court has subsequently
used the case, show that the Court meant to apply the "public
concern" test to state employees seeking to shine the light of day on
revelations or grievances related to their government workplace. In
Pickering, the teacher wrote a letter to the editor criticizing his school
143. See, e.g., Yared, supra note 16, at 22 (noting, in a discussion about Acanfora, that
under a Pickering analysis "the teacher's First Amendment rights are dependent upon the
ability of the students and parents to process the information that one of the teachers is
gay").
144. The Weaver court, for example, was faced with an extreme reaction in a
conservative Mormon community, so its application of Brennan's logic might not be as
easy in another community. See Weaver, 29 F. Supp. 2d. at 1284 n.3 (taking notice of
public debate concerning sexual orientation of a candidate for the Utah State Legislature);
see also supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the results of a 2001 Gallup Poll
finding that a sizable minority of Americans do not think gays should be teachers).
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board and its use of funds. 145 In Connick, the plaintiff's questionnaire
was intended to raise questions about the leadership of the district
attorneys for whom she worked.146 Both of these were attempts to
bring public attention to matters the employee felt were being
mishandled within a public agency. These situations deserve special
protection, both because citizens have an interest in the operation of
public agencies, for which they pay tax dollars, and because public
employees are specially situated to provide that vital information.'47
For these reasons, the Court created in Pickering and Connick a
special doctrine to deal with this difficult balancing of public and
private interests.
This is not to say that the quest for public attention must be an
indispensable element of a Pickering or Connick case. The Supreme
Court made that explicit in Givhan, a decision that was grounded in
solid public policy, to avoid the undesirable result-demonstrated in
the Rowland case-that a public employee has an incentive to take
her grievances about the management of her agency to the public
rather than first raising them internally.14 Still, the teacher in Givhan
was expressing concerns about school policy and procedure, just as in
Pickering. '49
In contrast, Ms. Rowland and Ms. Weaver were speaking about
themselves, not their employers. In Rowland v. Mad River,1 5 0 the
Sixth Circuit found it significant that Ms. Rowland purposefully did
not seek a public audience, a solid instinct after Givhan.15' However,
the Sixth Circuit misused this fact when it concluded that if Ms.
Rowland was speaking privately about her sexuality, her speech was
clearly not of public concern and therefore did not deserve First
Amendment protection.'52 When the speaker is speaking privately
145. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
146. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983).
147. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572; see also Altman v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 251 F.3d 1199,
1202 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that the way the corrections department dealt with the issue
of gays in the workplace "affects the performance of their public duties and is a matter of
political and social concern to the general public," and therefore employees' protests at a
sensitivity training seminar were speech on a matter of public concern).
148. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979).
149. Id. at 412-13; see also Cox v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 670-71 (8th
Cir. 1986) (holding that under Pickering, the dismissal of a representative of the teachers'
association who brought grievances to the principal and spoke out in disagreement with
him violated the representative's First Amendment rights to speak out on a matter of
public concern).
150. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
151. Id. at 449.
152. Id.
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about a private and personal matter, the "public concern" test should
be irrelevant. 153
In both Pickering and Connick, the fact that the employee's
speech was about her government employers was critical to the
Court's decision. 5 4 Because the speech was about the government
employer, it made sense to inquire into whether the employee was
speaking out as a citizen on a matter of public concern or as an
employee on an internal personnel matter and, if the employee was
speaking as a citizen, to balance government and employee interests
before awarding First Amendment protection. Both Pickering and
Connick are concerned with the opposing concerns of employee
loyalty and the public's need for information from inside its
government agencies. When a teacher makes a statement about his
own sexual orientation without seeking to engage in a wider political
debate on the issue, that teacher is not broadcasting information
gained through his special access as a public employee; he is
imparting information only about himself, not about the operations of
his school. As Rowland and subsequent cases demonstrate, the logic
of Pickering and Connick is strained beyond its capacity when it is
used to analyze speech that has nothing to do with one's employer.
By this reasoning, the facts of Connick would still call for a court
to apply the Pickering analysis, because the plaintiff in that case was
seeking public discussion of management decisions made by her
employer, the district attorney.'55 On the other hand, Rowland would
not be a candidate for Pickering analysis because Ms. Rowland was
expressing something about herself, not her employer. The Shahar
case is a closer question because it is not clear whether Ms. Shahar
intended with her commitment ceremony to make a public statement
153. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 480 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that a First Amendment
claim by public employees regarding off-duty activity does not present the threshold
"public concern" question, although it should still be analyzed under the balancing portion
of Pickering); see also Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that
courts have questioned whether the public concern test is appropriate in cases of off-duty
activity).
154. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-70 (1968) (discussing the state's
interests in employee loyalty in the context of statements made by state employees that
are critical of their employers); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1983) (discussing
cases preceding and following Pickering, all dealing with speech critical of government
employers); see also Schoen, supra note 66, at 8-9 (discussing the predominant role of the
employer-employee relationship in employee claims under Pickering and the factors
considered in the Pickering opinion, all of which were related to the fact that Pickering's
speech was critical of his government employer).
155. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Connick).
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about the state attorney general's prosecution of antisodomy laws or
other discriminatory policies; but in the absence of evidence that she
had such intent, her commitment ceremony was a private statement
of private beliefs, and as such should not fall under Pickering.156 By
employing this logic, the Weaver court, although commendable for its
instinct to protect Ms. Weaver's First Amendment rights, erred in
relying on Pickering.1 57
Instead, the teacher who faces retaliation for expressing her own
sexual orientation should be able to seek First Amendment
protection under the general standard of Tinker. 58 Tinker dealt with
the expression of personal convictions, not statements about the
school itself, and therefore is closer to the situation of a teacher
speaking about sexual orientation than is the Pickering analysis. 59
Under Tinker, the state must justify its desire to censor or sanction a
teacher's speech by reference to its core educational mission and a
showing of "material or substantial disruption" of the operation of its
schools.16 °
The principals of the schools where Ms. Rowland, Ms. Weaver,
and Mr. Crane worked could certainly demonstrate that their schools
had been disrupted.' t In the case of Ms. Weaver, students quit the
volleyball team, and administrators fielded phone calls and held
multiple meetings on the issue of Ms. Weaver's sexuality.162 At Mr.
Crane's school, parents pulled their children out of his class, and even
156. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Shahar).
157. See Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1283-84 (D. Utah 1998)
(applying the Pickering analysis).
158. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (holding
that in order to justify a prohibition on certain expression, the state must show at least that
it would or did " 'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' " (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363
F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966))).
159. See id. at 504 (describing the student speech at issue, a protest against the Vietnam
War).
160. Id. at 509 (finding that the Court's "independent examination of the record fails to
yield evidence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the
armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the
rights of other students").
161. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing community reaction to
Ms. Weaver); supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing community campaign
to oust Mr. Crane).
162. Weaver, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
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those parents with no objection to his teaching found themselves the
subject of mailings and flier campaigns led by other parents. 63
However, the language of the Tinker opinion makes clear that
this type of disruption is not the type that should justify suppressing
First Amendment rights. The "heckler's veto" is a proposition of
First Amendment jurisprudence that prevents private citizens from
being able to censor free expression by reacting in such a disruptive
manner that the state shuts down the speech itself."6 The essence of
the heckler's veto doctrine is that courts must separate the speech
from the resulting disruption, and determine whether the disruption
was truly caused by the speaker or instead by her opponents. The
classic example arose in the 1949 Supreme Court decision in
Terminello v. Chicago.'65 Terminello gave a speech to a large
audience in a public meeting hall; outside, an angry crowd of
protesters condemned his speech and created a violent disturbance.
166
Terminello was charged and convicted under a city ordinance
forbidding anyone to aid or assist in any riot, disturbance, or breach
of peace. 167 The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, holding that
the ordinance as applied violated Terminello's First Amendment
right to freedom of speech. 168 The Terminello Court stated clearly
that:
[S]peech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling
effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why
freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely
to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive
163. See Jill Smolowe, The Unmarrying Kind: Focusing on Local Targets, Religious
Conservatives Wage a Fervent Campaign to Stomp Out Gay Rights, TIME, Apr. 29, 1996, at
68, 68-69 (describing harassment campaign against Gerry Crane).
164. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33 (2004) (holding
that to allow one objecting parent to end the voluntary recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance by willing students would be an unwarranted "heckler's veto"); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (striking down a law that would allow citizens to censor
indecent speech on the internet simply by suggesting that an under-eighteen-year-old
might be listening).
165. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
166. Id. at 2-3. The Court's opinion is not specific about the contents of Terminello's
speech, other than to note that he "vigorously, if not viciously, criticized various political
and racial groups." Id.
167. Id. at 2 n.1.
168. Id. at 4.
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evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest.
169
Tinker makes clear that expressing concern for "disruption" of
the school community is not opening the door for a heckler's veto:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression .... Any word spoken in class, in the lunchroom, or
on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person
may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our
Constitution says we must take this risk; and our history says
that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of
openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in
this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.17 0
The disruption to the Nebo school community caused by Ms.
Weaver's disclosure of her homosexuality, just like that caused by Ms.
Rowland's disclosures more than twenty years earlier, were not
caused by those teachers-who in fact took strides to avoid public
conflict-but by the actions of colleagues and parents.171 To allow
those reactions to serve as a legitimate basis for school actions to
"closet" gay teachers would be to allow the quintessential heckler's
veto.17
2
This reasoning can be extended to create a sort of estoppel in
situations where a school's actions, not the teacher's speech, create a
public controversy over the teacher's "coming out." The Weaver
decision highlighted this problem, stating that "[e]ven if Ms. Weaver's
statement about her sexual orientation in response to a question is
not viewed as a matter of public concern, the actions of the
169. Id. (citation omitted).
170. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969)
(citation omitted).
171. See Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1285 (D. Utah 1998) (finding
that the inquiries and complaints the school received are not evidence of substantial
disruption of the schdol community).
172. The Second Circuit has taken the opposite view on this point. See Melzer v. Bd. of
Educ., 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003). In declining to find a heckler's veto caused by parental
disruption, the court stated that "[plarents are not outsiders seeking to heckle Melzer into
silence, rather they are participants in public education, without whose cooperation public
education as a practical matter cannot function. Any disruption created by parents can be
fairly characterized as internal disruption to the operation of the school ...." Id. at 199.
The Melzer case can be distinguished from cases involving gay teachers by its extreme
facts; Mr. Melzer was in fact advocating sexual relationships with boys the same age as his
students, which is very different from homosexuality and gives rise to legitimate anxiety
and disruption of his ability to teach. See id. at 189, 198.
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defendants... transmuted what should have been a private issue into
a matter of public concern." '173 These actions began when Ms.
Weaver's ex-husband spoke to faculty members and administrators
about her sexual orientation-before she had ever spoken about it-
and the information spread into the community, sparking calls from
community members and meetings about the topic among
administrators.174 The district court stated that, in its Pickering
analysis, the behavior of Ms. Weaver's employers in spreading the
information around the school system and into the community should
preclude those defendants from later claiming that her sexuality was
merely a private matter.175 This conclusion would follow equally had
the court used a Tinker analysis: any disruption of the school
community resulted from the actions of the school administrators,
and therefore they should be estopped from citing it as a justification
for silencing Ms. Weaver.
In addition, a school should not be able to legitimately base its
suppression of teachers' out-speech on those disruptive actions that
are caused by private anti-gay prejudice. 76 "Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect."'77 The Romer decision highlights a judicial shift
from considering animus against homosexuals to be an acceptable
government rationale, to treating it like any other racial, ethnic, or
religious bias.178 Especially after Romer, instances of personal animus
should not weigh on the side of the school in any decision to sanction
the teacher for his speech. If, for example, a teacher's participation in
a gay pride parade resulted in complaints from parents or students
173. Weaver, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (stating that animus toward an
unpopular group "cannot constitute a legitimate government interest" (quoting Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).
177. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (referring to the potential effect of
racial prejudice on a biracial child); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding the city may not give effect to the prejudices of community
members against the mentally retarded); Weaver, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1289 (holding that a
school cannot take action against a teacher because of a negative community reaction that
is based purely on private antipathy against homosexuals).
178. See Romer 517 U.S. at 634-35 (stating that animus toward an unpopular group,
specifically homosexuals, "cannot constitute a legitimate government interest" (quoting
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)); see also, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (suggesting ways in which private homosexual activity by an employee might impair
a government agency, including the potential for blackmail, providing evidence of an
"unstable personality," and causing disruptions because of the reactions of other
employees or the public).
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because they feel that such a stance is immoral and those who
advocate it are per se unfit to be teachers, the resulting disruption in
the school's operation is caused not by the teacher, but by the private
prejudices of those parents or students. In addition, any disruption of
the working relationship between the teacher and her supervisor or
colleagues is likely to result only if those coworkers find
homosexuality distasteful. 7 9
This is not to say that teachers can engage in any and all
expressive activities related to sexuality without consequence.
Teachers' contracts are generally subject to state law provisions about
their "fitness" to teach, and many still contain "immorality" clauses. 8 '
Courts must still determine whether a parental complaint is
motivated wholly by animosity toward the teacher's viewpoint or
expresses a legitimate concern about fitness to teach. These are, to a
point, subjective judicial judgments. In the 1970s, public out-speech
by a teacher was considered legitimate grounds for concern about his
mental health18' or fitness to teach. 82 Today, many would agree that
those decisions arose from unfounded stereotypes about gay people.
However, a recent Second Circuit decision, Melzer v. Board of
Education,'83 demonstrates that even today, courts must make value
judgments about what type of expression gives rise to legitimate
parental concerns. Mr. Melzer, a high school teacher, was an active
member of, and occasionally wrote newsletters for, the North
American Man-Boy Love Association ("NAMBLA"), an
organization that advocates for the abolition of laws limiting sexual
179. The Court in Pickering was especially concerned with the effect, or lack of effect,
that the teacher's speech might have on relationships with and among administrators and
coworkers, especially when that speech is about his employer. See Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563,569-70 (1968).
180. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-325(b) (2005) (stating the grounds for dismissal
of a career employee, including "immorality"); see also Shaw v. Minn. Bd. of Teaching,
No. C0-00-2173, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 609, at *22-23 (Minn. Ct. App. June 5, 2001)
(upholding a two-year suspension of a teaching license under an "immoral conduct"
provision of a state teaching statute, after a teacher engaged in homosexual conduct in a
public bathroom); Jason R. Fulmer, Dismissing the "Immoral" Teacher for Conduct
Outside the Workplace, 31 J.L. & EDUc. 271, 272 n.10 (2002) (listing a sample of state
statutes that make "immorality" grounds for dismissal).
181. See Gish v. Bd. of Educ., 366 A.2d 1337, 1341-42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(per curiam) (holding that a school board acted rationally in determining that a teacher's
decision to assume the presidency of the New Jersey Gay Activists Alliance displayed
evidence of deviation from normal mental health, and ordering him to undergo psychiatric
examination).
182. Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist., 559 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wash. 1977).
183. 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003).
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activity between adult men and underage boys."' There was no
evidence that Mr. Melzer had ever engaged in inappropriate sexual
conduct with any of his students.185 The Second Circuit applied
Pickering and found that, because of NAMBLA's mission of
advocating social change, Mr. Melzer's association with this group
was probably speech on a matter of public concern.'86 Nonetheless,
under Pickering's balancing test, the court found that Melzer's
employers did not violate the First Amendment by terminating him. 87
The court was convinced that the anxiety his beliefs would cause
students and parents would likely cause substantial disruption-from
students unable to concentrate in class or unwilling to be alone with
their teacher, to parents removing their children from his class. 8 The
Melzer opinion does note that the government generally may not help
members of the public express their anger against the expression of
unpopular ideas, but seems to find (without explicitly stating) that the
reaction of parents to Melzer's particular beliefs is more than just
personal prejudice or animus.'89 This example does not serve by any
means to place pedophilia on the same spectrum of scenarios as
homosexuality, but simply to demonstrate that courts must make
value judgments in determining the outer limits of protected private
speech.
Today's courts are not without guidance in making this
distinction between prejudice and legitimate concern. The Supreme
Court's decisions in Romer and Lawrence demonstrate that, at the
very least, gay Americans are now to be treated as a legitimate social
and political group.190  Thus, acknowledging one's own sexual
184. Id. at 189 (describing NAMBLA and Melzer's self-described pedophilia). Mr.
Melzer did not make his membership public, but was "outed" as a NAMBLA member
during an undercover investigation by a local television station. Id. at 191.
185. Id. at 189.
186. Id. at 196 (noting that the plaintiff's association with NAMBLA would probably
pass the public concern test, but not explicitly holding that it does because it is not
essential to the outcome, as the plaintiff loses in the balancing portion of Pickering
analysis).
187. Id. at 198-99.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 199 ("We acknowledge the truism that community reaction cannot dictate
whether an employee's constitutional rights are protected. We also recognize that
allowing the public, with the government's help, to shout down unpopular ideas that stir
anger is generally not permitted under our jurisprudence. .... Yet, Melzer's position as a
teacher leaves him somewhat beholden to the views of parents in the community."
(citations omitted)).
190. See Leslie, supra note 42, at 215 (noting that "Lawrence is a historic landmark
because it changes the entire relationship between gay Americans and their Supreme
Court" by virtue of the fact that the Court agreed to hear the case at all). See generally
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orientation or expressing support for gay issues is an expression of
membership in this social group or solidarity with its members; this
type of speech must fall on the "protected" side of the line drawn by
the First Amendment, even in the more restricted environment of the
public school.19'
III. OUT-SPEECH INSIDE THE CLASSROOM
The teachers whose cases are addressed in Part II all made
statements about their sexual orientation outside the context of the
classroom. This Part will conduct a separate analysis of teacher out-
speech that occurs in a classroom setting. Courts evaluate speech in
the classroom (and other "curricular" settings)1" in a very different
way from speech outside the classroom. This reflects the difference
between clearly personal acts of expression (like the black armbands
at issue in Tinker), and occasions when observers might believe that
the speaker is speaking for the school.'93 Teachers' First Amendment
freedom of speech is more limited in the classroom than outside it.
However, this Comment argues that schools must still exercise this
heightened control in a narrowly tailored and viewpoint neutral
manner.
When the issue arises of whether certain speech in the school
setting could be attributed to the school or the state itself, courts have
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2003) (noting that the importance of Lawrence goes far
beyond sodomy laws, to the stereotypes and maltreatment that those laws were used to
justify).
191. Note that, by extension, teachers and students must receive a certain amount of
First Amendment protection in expressing a belief that homosexuality is wrong, as long as
their expression does not infringe upon the rights of others or violate the Tinker standard.
See, e.g., Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 955 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding in
favor of the school district in an equal protection suit brought by a gay teacher who
suffered a mental breakdown after alleged harassment by students and parents, and
discussing the fine line schools must walk in not censoring students expressing sincere
belief and the fact that schools have no control over the prejudices of parents).
192. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 374 (citing copious authority for the proposition
that "curricular areas of the school typically are not public forums").
193. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) (expressly
choosing to apply Hazelwood instead of Pickering to evaluate classroom speech by a
teacher, because Pickering dealt with the state's interest as an employer but not as an
educator). The 2006 Supreme Court opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951
(2006), makes an explicit distinction between speech by a government employee while
acting pursuant to his official duties, and speech by a government employee when acting
as a citizen. Id. at 1960. This holding echoes the distinction made in this Comment
between private speech and school-sponsored speech, although it is not clear what further
ramifications the Garcetti decision will have on First Amendment cases in the school
setting.
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integrated the First Amendment concept of forum analysis, a concept
that has not been used in the cases governed by Tinker or Pickering in
which speech just happens to be on school grounds.'94 In brief, forum
analysis is a First Amendment doctrine developed to accommodate
the government's need to regulate freedom of expression on
government property, depending on the geographical and social
context. 95  Courts applying forum analysis have divided public
property into three types of forums: public, limited public, and
nonpublic. A public forum is a public place that "by long tradition or
by government fiat ha[s] been devoted to assembly and debate."'196
When the state opens up public property to only certain types of
expressive activity or discussion of certain subjects, it creates a limited
public forum. 197 In a public forum, the government cannot impose
content-based restrictions unless they are necessary to achieve a
compelling government interest and are narrowly drawn to that
end. 19 In limited public forums, the government may impose
reasonable regulations on the content of speech in order to confine
the forum to the purposes for which it was created.' 99 In either public
or limited public forums, any viewpoint-based restrictions of speech
face a strong presumption of unconstitutionality.2 °°
In the school context, for example, the Supreme Court has used
the limited public forum concept to require that if a university has a
policy of funding student publications, it cannot deny funds to those
that espouse a religious viewpoint." 1 It has also held that if a school
194. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 371-72 (discussing the lack of forum analysis in
Tinker v. Des Moines and subsequent confusion over whether it applies in schools).
195. For a full discussion of forum analysis, see CHEMERINKSY, supra note 53, at 1082-
1111.
196. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Peiry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
197. Id. at 46-47.
198. See, e.g., Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at
46-47. Public forums are divided into traditional public forums (like sidewalks and
streets), and designated public forums, which the state has taken steps to open up to free
expression. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
199. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46 ("In addition to time, place, and manner
regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view."); see also Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993) (holding that "the
total ban on using district property for religious purposes could survive First Amendment
challenge only if excluding this category of speech was reasonable and viewpoint
neutral").
200. See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995) ("Discrimination
against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional .... [V]iewpoint
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.").
201. Id. at 832-33.
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district has a policy of allowing its buildings to be used by community
groups after school hours, it cannot deny access only to religious
groups. 202
Finally, public property that is not opened for public
communication by tradition or designation is a nonpublic forum, and
the state may use reasonable content regulations to reserve this forum
for its intended purposes, as long as the regulations are viewpoint
neutral. 203  For example, in Perry Education Association v. Perry
Local Educators' Association,'°4 a group of teachers brought suit
seeking access to the teachers' mailbox system in their school to
distribute fliers for their organization. 25  The Supreme Court held
that the school district had not created a public forum with its internal
mailbox system. 206 Therefore, the school could reserve the forum for
its intended purpose (allowing only communications from the official
teachers' union) as long as the regulations were reasonable and "not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker's view. "207 Also relevant in the school context is
"government speech," which falls outside the spectrum of forum
analysis. 28  When the government itself is speaking through its
representatives or agents, it can adopt a viewpoint to the exclusion of
others, and it can take steps to make sure that its message is not
garbled by the speakers.2 9
In public schools jurisprudence, most speech in the classroom or
other curricular settings has been designated "school-sponsored"
202. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-93.
203. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
204. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
205. Id. at 40.
206. Id. at 38-39. The Perry Township public school system had granted the official
teachers' union (elected by the teachers as their bargaining representative) access to the
mailbox system, and the plaintiff was a rival teachers' group that sought the same free
access. Id.
207. Id. at 46.
208. See Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 626 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005)
("The Supreme Court has indicated ... that when the government restricts its own speech,
the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny falls somewhere off the ... spectrum of forum
analysis."), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1880 (2006).
209. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991) (upholding federal regulations
preventing recipients of Title X funding from engaging in advocacy of, counseling for, or
referrals for abortion); see also Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that a bulletin board placed by administrators in a school hallway was
government speech and that administrators could restrict discussion of sexual orientation
on the board to advocating tolerance, without allowing expression of opposing views).
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speech, which is a school-specific type of nonpublic forum. 2 0 The
Court began to distinguish school-sponsored speech from private
expression in Bethel v. Fraser,211 a suit brought by a student who was
disciplined after giving a bawdy speech at a school-sponsored student
assembly.212 The Supreme Court held that the student's speech was
not protected by the First Amendment, and preventing this kind of
speech was properly a matter for the discretion of the school board.213
The Court took pains to distinguish this type of student speech from
the speech in Tinker because it was both intentionally disruptive and
not related to the expression of a political viewpoint.214 The Bethel
opinion emphasized the school's role in inculcating " 'habits and
manners of civility' "215 in the students, and its need to disassociate
itself from the student's uncivil expression.216 The Court also asserted
that the school must consider the age and maturity level of the
audience in making its decisions about what content is appropriate in
school-sponsored speech.217 These considerations demonstrate how
the control the school exerts over speech in this forum was related to
the purpose for which the forum was created.
Two years after Bethel, the Court further refined its attitude
toward school-sponsored speech in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.215 In Hazelwood, a high school principal removed some
content related to teenage pregnancy and divorce from a student
newspaper produced by the high school journalism class.219  The
Hazelwood Court employed forum analysis and determined that the
student newspaper was not a public forum, but instead was a "school-
sponsored forum. "220 As such, the school had the right to regulate
content based on its legitimate pedagogical concerns, as well as its
need to avoid the perception that the school was endorsing or
210. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267-70 (1988) (referring to a
student newspaper as a "school-sponsored" forum).
211. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
212. Id. at 677-79. The Court's opinion does not quote the student's speech, in support
of a candidate for student government, but simply notes that "[d]uring the entire speech,
Fraser referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphor." Id. at 677-78.
213. Id. at 683.
214. Id. at 680.
215. Id. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIc HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
216. Id. at 685-86.
217. Id. at 684.
218. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
219. Id. at 263-64.
220. Id. at 267-70.
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sanctioning certain statements.221 In keeping with its longstanding
tradition of deferring to the educational judgment of school boards,
the Court made clear that when the context of certain speech can be
seen as curricular, regulations on the content of that speech are
properly left up to the school board.222
As with Tinker, the Court used language in Hazelwood that
encompassed not just the student speech at issue but "the speech of
students, teachers, and other members of the school community. 223
Federal courts have repeatedly employed Hazelwood to find that
school administrators can and should reserve classrooms for the
purpose of teaching a specific subject, and "if students' expression in
a school newspaper bears the imprimatur of the school, then a
teacher's expression in the 'traditional classroom setting' also bears
the imprimatur of the school. 224
Courts have been uncertain on how to reconcile Hazelwood with
other tests of speech in the schools,225 but at least one commentator
has suggested that Hazelwood should only apply when the location or
context of the speech, rather than its content, makes the speech
objectionable to school authorities.226 In practice, this idea leads to
the conclusion that while Pickering is the rule for most speech by
teachers in public forums or outside the classroom, within the
classroom the Hazelwood analysis dominates. 227 Teachers' classroom
221. Id. at 270-73.
222. Id. at 267 (holding that " '[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board'"
(quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986))).
223. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 267; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 481-82 (citing
inclusive language of Hazelwood opinion, but noting confusion among lower courts about
the different degrees of protection afforded to teachers and students). But see Karen C.
Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers' Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J.L. &
EDUC. 1, 12-13 (2001) (explaining that "[a]lthough lower courts have assumed otherwise,
nothing in Hazelwood mandates the use of an identical standard for teacher and student"
and that lower courts have not articulated a sufficient reason for their decision to do so).
224. Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Ward v.
Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a teacher could be denied tenure
based on discussion of abortion in a biology classroom because "[1]ike the newspaper, a
teacher's classroom speech is part of the curriculum. Indeed, a teacher's principal
classroom role is to teach students the school curriculum. Thus, schools may reasonably
limit teachers' speech in that setting.").
225. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 375 (describing the difficulty of reconciling
Hazelwood's forum analysis with Tinker).
226. See id. at 375-77 (setting forth the argument that "the Court intended that the
material and substantial disruption test should be applied . . . where the restriction is
unrelated to the character of the specific location where the speech is expressed").
227. See, e.g., Ward, 996 F.2d at 452 (applying Hazelwood and making no reference at
all to Pickering in finding that a high school biology teacher could properly be denied
336 [Vol. 85
2006] OUT-SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 337
speech is therefore subject to content-based regulations that are
"reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical interest. '228 Instead
of focusing on the reaction to the speech, as the Pickering analysis
does, the Hazelwood analysis of classroom speech focuses on the
school's reasons for restricting the speech.
The Hazelwood decision lists three types of legitimate
pedagogical concerns that could justify restricting the content of
expressive activities in the classroom or other settings "that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear
the imprimatur of the school., 229 These reasons include the need "to
assure that [students] learn whatever lessons the activity is designed
to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that
may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of
the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
school. "23
These rationales can cover a broad range of situations, as ensuing
lower court decisions demonstrate. In Miles v. Denver Public
Schools, 2 1 the plaintiff teacher was disciplined after he commented in
class about what he saw as the declining quality of the school and
made reference to a recent rumor about two students "making out"
on the school tennis courts.232 The Tenth Circuit held that the school
advanced legitimate pedagogical interests under Hazelwood when it
prevented the teacher from using his authority to confirm an
unsubstantiated rumor; the school was ensuring professionalism and
tenure for a classroom discussion of abortion); Miles, 944 F.2d at 777 (expressly choosing
to apply Hazelwood instead of Pickering to evaluate classroom speech by a teacher,
because Pickering dealt with the state's interest as an employer, but not as an educator);
see also Daly, supra note 223, at 7-11 (discussing why Pickering is inapplicable to in-class
speech).
228. Miles, 944 F.2d at 778; see also Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617,
628 (2d Cir. 2005) (regarding censorship of a student-produced poster that contained
religious content), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1880 (2006); Ward, 996 F.2d at 452 (finding that a
school may regulate a teacher's classroom speech if "the regulation is reasonably related
to a legitimate pedagogical concern" and the teacher has some notice of what conduct is
prohibited).
229. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
230. Id.; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (discussing a
school district's need to prohibit lewd or age-inappropriate conduct). For an analogous
discussion in the context of private employers, see Rachael Knight, Comment, From
Hester Prynne to Crystal Chambers: Unwed Mothers, Authentic Role Models, and Coerced
Speech, 25 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 481 (2004) (discussing cases in which an
employer's First Amendment right not to be associated with certain conduct of which it
disapproves-which Knight terms "coerced speech"-has trumped an employee's Title
VII discrimination claim).
231. 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
232. Id. at 774.
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sound judgment among its teachers and preventing teachers from
making statements about students that could embarrass them.233 In
Silano v. Sag Harbor,"34 the Second Circuit found that a school acted
pursuant to legitimate pedagogical concerns when it censored a guest
lecturer who showed a film clip of bare-breasted women to a tenth
grade mathematics class, where the images were irrelevant and
unnecessary to his ability to convey the information he was teaching,
and were, in the school's judgment, inappropriate.235 These decisions
show that courts tend to grant wide deference to school
administrators' educational judgment when it comes to restricting
classroom speech.236
A. Viewpoint Neutrality and Prior Notice Under Hazelwood
Courts operating under Hazelwood give greater deference to
schools in censoring classroom speech, as opposed to private speech,
as long as the restriction is motivated by concern "that participants
learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers
or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for
their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker
233. Id. at 778.
234. 42 F.3d 719 (2d Cir. 1994).
235. Id. at 723-24.
236. In 2006, the Supreme Court added a potential new wrinkle to this analysis with its
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). Ceballos was a deputy district
attorney who, as part of his job duties, investigated a warrant issued in a criminal case and
wrote two memos to his supervisors stating that he felt the warrant was based on
misrepresentation and the case should be dropped; he also testified to that effect on behalf
of the defendant in a hearing on the subject. Id. at 1955-56. Ceballos claimed that he was
thereafter subject to retaliation at work, including a transfer and a denied promotion. Id.
at 1956. The Ninth Circuit applied a Pickering-Connick analysis, finding that Ceballos's
speech was on a matter of public concern and deserved First Amendment protection. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ceballos's speech was not protected by the
First Amendment because he was speaking not as a citizen, but as an employee carrying
out his official duties. Id. at 1960. Thus, the Court created a new distinction in public
employee speech cases: is the employee speaking as a citizen-as the Court said the
plaintiffs in Pickering and Connick were-or is he simply making statements pursuant to
his official duties? See id. It is too early to tell how this decision will apply in the school
setting. It would be logical to see a teacher delivering a lesson, at least, as speech in the
performance of his or her official duties, and thus not protected under Garcetti. However,
Justice Kennedy noted in the majority opinion that "[t]here is some argument that
expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary
employee-speech jurisprudence," and therefore explicitly did not decide whether the
Garcetti analysis would apply to a case involving teaching. Id. at 1962. Based on this
caveat, it is possible that, faced with another First Amendment case involving a teacher,
the Court would still revert to its Hazelwood analysis.
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are not erroneously attributed to the school. '237 However, the circuits
are split over whether Hazelwood opened the door, not only to
regulation of the content of classroom speech, but also to restrictions
based specifically upon the viewpoint expressed-for instance,
sanctioning a gay teacher for discussing her orientation or answering
questions about homosexuality, but not imposing similar restrictions
on straight teachers or discussions about other sexual orientations.238
The Second and Tenth Circuits have held that Hazelwood allows
viewpoint discrimination as long as it is reasonably related to a
legitimate pedagogical concern, while the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits have retained the notion that, even though Hazelwood does
allow content-based restriction, the government is still barred from
viewpoint discrimination in nonpublic forums.23 9 The district court in
Weaver took up the latter distinction, finding that the school district
committed viewpoint discrimination when it "only targeted speech
concerning homosexual orientation and not heterosexual
orientation.""24 As the Weaver verdict was not appealed to the Tenth
Circuit, it is unclear whether this reasoning would have survived
appellate scrutiny. 41
237. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); see also Silano, 42
F.3d at 722-23 (noting that "the Court also has recognized that public schools may limit
classroom speech to promote educational goals"); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st
Cir. 1993) (noting that "[i]t stands to reason that whether a regulation is reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns will depend on, among other things, the age
and sophistication of the students, the relationship between teaching method and valid
educational objective, and the context and manner of the presentation").
238. See Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 632 n.9 (2d Cir. 2005)
(discussing whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination and describing the
"conflicting conclusions" reached by various circuits), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1880 (2006).
239. Id.; see also Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 925-28 (10th Cir.
2002) (finding that Hazelwood does not require viewpoint neutrality, and that the desire
to avoid controversy is a valid pedagogical concern); Ward, 996 F.2d at 454 (noting that
"the Court in Kuhlmeier did not require that school regulation of school-sponsored speech
be viewpoint neutral"). But see Planned Parenthood of S. Nev. Inc., v. Clark County Sch.
Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (considering viewpoint neutrality as one
element of reasonable content regulation by a school); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist.,
228 F.3d 1003, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming Planned Parenthood as to its use of
viewpoint neutrality analysis); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 1989)
(finding Hazelwood did not intend to rewrite First Amendment law on viewpoint
neutrality); Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 797 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(confirming that viewpoint neutrality is still the rule in the Eleventh Circuit). The Third
Circuit is apparently internally divided on this question. See C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195
F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that "a viewpoint-based restriction on student speech
in the classroom may be reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns and thus
permissible"), aff'd en banc by an equally divided court, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).
240. Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1286 (D. Utah 1998).
241. See, e.g., id. at 1286.
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In addition to the question of viewpoint discrimination, some
courts have expressed concern that teachers have advance notice of
what they can and cannot say in the classroom. 2 42 Overbroad policies
prohibiting any discussion of homosexuality may be challenged as not
providing precise enough guidance for teachers and thus chilling
speech beyond the scope of the justification for the regulation. The
Supreme Court addressed this problem during the McCarthy era,
striking down a state law that required teachers to certify in writing
that they were not members of the Communist Party; the policy was
unconstitutional because, among other reasons, it was too vague and
broad to give teachers notice of what activity was prohibited.243 The
Court proclaimed:
When one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose him
his position, one necessarily will steer far wider of the unlawful
zone .... The danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise
of vital First Amendment rights must be guarded against by
sensitive tools which clearly inform teachers what is being
proscribed.244
This concern with advance notice is related to Due Process
Clause concerns about vagueness and overbreadth, which apply to
restrictions on speech as well as to other types of school policies; the
Due Process Clause is implicated whenever someone could be
punished for an action without sufficient notice that such action was
punishable. 245 The Court seemed to reinforce this in Mt. Healthy v.
Doyle2 46 when it found that a teacher's conduct in communicating
with a local radio show about an internal school policy was protected
by the First Amendment, citing as evidence only that "[t]here is no
suggestion by the Board that Doyle violated any established policy, or
242. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977)
(finding for the plaintiff teacher on the basis of Pickering and citing as evidence that the
teacher's conduct did not violate any existing board policy); Ward, 996 F.2d at 453
(holding that post-speech retaliation against a teacher must be based on some prior
prohibition).
243. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
244. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Daly, supra note 223, at 5
n.16 (suggesting that homosexuality is arguably the Red Scare of the 1990s).
245. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573-74 (1974) (striking down a Massachusetts
statute regarding misuse of the American flag because it was so vague that it allowed
authorities to enforce it according to their own viewpoints); see also SCHNEIDER, supra
note 57, at 383 (discussing how "vague or overbroad restrictions on speech ordinarily will
not pass constitutional muster").
246. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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that its reaction to his communication to the radio station was
anything more than an ad hoc response to Doyle's action ... 247
Despite this precedent, only the First Circuit has explicitly
required advance notice of prohibitions on classroom speech under
Hazelwood.248  The First Circuit test requires that, under existing
regulations and procedures, it be reasonable for the school to expect a
teacher to know that certain conduct was prohibited.249 The Second
Circuit has made some movement in the opposite direction,
dismissing the need for "clearly established rules and procedures"
before a school could censor a guest speaker's use of a video
depicting bare-chested women.250  Silano cited to a footnote in
Hazelwood which declared, "We reject respondents' suggestion that
school officials be permitted to exercise prepublication control over
school-sponsored publications only pursuant to specific written
regulations. To require such regulations in the context of a curricular
activity could unduly constrain the ability of educators to educate. 25'
However, because Hazelwood dealt with prepublication censorship, it
does not speak to the issue of post hoc retaliation in the absence of
advance notice that the speech was proscribed. Other courts have not
made advance notice an explicit requirement but have noted that
teachers' First Amendment claims in the classroom may carry more
weight when they have violated no existing school policy.2
B. Restrictions on Classroom Speech Should Be Viewpoint Neutral
and Written in Advance
In applying the heightened state interests of Hazelwood to gay
teachers wishing to be open about their orientation in their classes,
the first question is whether the speech may properly be considered
247. Id. at 284.
248. See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that notice of what
conduct is prohibited is one element of permissible regulation of teachers' speech).
249. Id. at 454.
250. Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir.
1994).
251. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.6 (1988), cited in Silano,
42 F.3d at 723.
252. See supra note 242 (discussing cases in which the court emphasized the lack of
advance notice); see also Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 539-42 (10th Cir. 1979)
(surveying cases regarding teachers' First Amendment rights within the classroom, and
finding that in most instances when the teacher prevailed, school authorities acted in the
absence of a general policy, after the fact, and had little to charge against the teacher other
than the assignment with which they were unhappy); Daly, supra note 223, at 19-24
(discussing how "[c]ourts are more likely to vindicate a teacher's First Amendment rights
when [the teacher] had no [advance] notice that her speech was proscribed").
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school-sponsored, as in Hazelwood, or government speech. When
speaking in front of a classroom or school assembly, teachers are state
employees, imparting a state-created curriculum. They are often
asked to pass along a state-chosen perspective, as demonstrated by
recent debates over teaching evolution and intelligent design.253
However, although courts have long given state and local authorities
full authority over curricular decisions, they have generally not gone
so far as to treat teachers as mere mouthpieces of the state.254 Speech
by school administrators or others in policymaking positions may be
treated as government speech.255 However, it is hard to imagine that
a teacher's discussion with his class about sexual orientation could be
considered government speech, unless perhaps it occurs in the context
of a class on human sexuality with a specific policy on the topic.
Therefore it is safe to assume that teacher speech on the topic of
sexual orientation in a classroom setting would be considered school-
sponsored speech and analyzed under the Hazelwood standard.
Those circuits maintaining that Hazelwood allows viewpoint
discrimination reason, in general, that the desire to avoid
controversy-and avoid allowing the imprimatur of the school to rest
on a controversial viewpoint-can constitute a valid pedagogical
concern. 2 6 The First Circuit in Ward v. Hickey57 emphasized this
concern by distinguishing Hazelwood from its predecessor, Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,25 s which
dealt with access to teacher mailboxes and explicitly required
253. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 572 (1987) (striking down a Louisiana statute
prohibiting teachers from teaching evolution in public classrooms unless accompanied by
instruction in creation science); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (reversing Dover school board adoption of a script for teachers regarding
intelligent design).
254. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(affirming that teachers have First Amendment rights inside the school); Cary, 598 F.2d at
543 (holding that teachers have some right to freedom of expression in the classroom and
cannot be made to merely read from a school-board-approved script). But see Daly, supra
note 223, at 3 (arguing that by inconsistent application of Pickering and Hazelwood, courts
have allowed school boards to create excessive restrictions on teachers' speech, reducing
the teacher's role to that of a "hired mouthpiece").
255. See, e.g., Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that a hallway bulletin board overseen by the school administrators is government
speech); Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 794-95 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(giving as evidence that a school-sponsored forum was not government speech the fact
that "not a single school administrator or teacher conveyed any viewpoint or message,"
implying that presentations by these figures might have moved it from a limited public
forum toward government speech).
256. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 925-27 (10th Cir. 2002).
257. 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
258. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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viewpoint neutrality. 259 The First Circuit stated that the difference lay
in the fact that any decision made by the school administrators in
Perry about access to teacher mailboxes was not motivated by
concerns about students learning appropriate classroom lessons.260
This dichotomy implies that the decision of what is "appropriate" for
students may require rejection of certain expressed viewpoints.
It is reasonable to allow schools to avoid certain controversial
subjects in school-sponsored speech. From Tinker through Bethel to
Hazelwood, courts have consistently recognized the desire to avoid
disruption, maintain order, and model civility, as a legitimate
pedagogical interest.261  However, avoiding controversial subjects
altogether is not the same as discriminating based on the viewpoint
expressed. The prohibition on censorship based on the viewpoint
expressed has been such a fundamental part of First Amendment
jurisprudence for so long that it is hard to imagine that the Supreme
Court in Hazelwood would obviate that rule without giving it some
attention in the opinion.262 In fact, the Court did not mention
viewpoint discrimination because there was no controversial
viewpoint at issue in the censorship of the student newspaper articles
in Hazelwood; the concerns of the administration, as accepted by the
district court, had to do with possible violations of privacy or
anonymity and the appropriateness of the subject matter for some of
the younger students at the school. 263  This was in line with the
concerns in Bethel about obscenity and age-appropriateness.
2 64
Interpreting this silence as disregard for the issue of viewpoint
discrimination is thus unwarranted.
259. Ward, 996 F.2d at 454.
260. Id.
261. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (holding that
schools need not tolerate speech that is inconsistent with their educational mission);
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (finding that schools may prohibit
speech and conduct that goes against the lessons of "civil, mature conduct"); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) ("[Tlhe Court has repeatedly
emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools.").
262. See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (holding that "[it is
axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content
or the message it conveys"); see also Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 n.7 (11th Cir.
1989) (finding no indication in Hazelwood that the Supreme Court intended to "drastically
rewrite First Amendment law to allow a school official to discriminate based on a
speaker's views").
263. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 264-65.
264. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 684 (discussing the importance of a school's ability to
regulate speech for the maturity of the audience).
20061
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From the facts of the circuit court cases that led to this split, it
appears that the confusion actually lies around the definition of
"viewpoint discrimination." In some cases in which the court
approved of viewpoint discrimination, the speech restriction in fact
most resembled the Hazelwood approach of avoiding certain
controversial topics altogether. For example, Fleming v. Jefferson
County School District265 involved a memorial art project organized
by Columbine High School when it reopened after the infamous
school shooting of 1999.266 The plaintiffs challenged the school's
policy prohibiting the hanging of tiles that included, among other
elements, references to the attack or religious symbols.2 67  These
blanket policies placed certain symbols off-limits, perhaps in part to
avoid controversy, but also because the goal of the project was to
"assist in community healing" and make the school a positive learning
environment again, goals that the school argued would not be
furthered by displaying tiles with messages that reminded the
students of violence or caused emotional distress.268  Likewise, the
teacher in Ward v. Hickey269 was punished for a discussion about
abortion in her biology class; the district court, in finding for the
defendant school board members, apparently found that their action
had not been viewpoint-based 7.2  The issue of the teacher's views on
abortion and whether they formed the basis for her termination was
not before the First Circuit on appeal, and the decision does not
discuss it, other than its aside stating that the lower court had been
wrong about viewpoint neutrality. 1 In neither of these cases did the
court find that the school had chosen to censor a certain perspective
while allowing teachers or students to air opposing viewpoints
unpunished.
This is admittedly a fine distinction, because to many, disallowing
religious expression or discussion of abortion-or homosexuality-
may be tantamount to expressing disapproval of those topics.27 2 For
example, a parent whose child was not allowed to read a Bible story
265. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
266. Id. at 920-22.
267. Id. at 921.
268. Id.
269. 966 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
270. Id. at 451 (discussing trial court's finding that a key board member did not in fact
disagree with the plaintiff's views).
271. Id. at 454.
272. See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (describing viewpoint
discrimination as a subset of content discrimination, but acknowledging that the
distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination "is not a precise one").
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to his first grade class interpreted this action by the teacher as
conveying disapproval of his Christian views.273  The Third Circuit
agreed with the plaintiff, holding that state policies restricting certain
religious expression discriminated against nonsecular viewpoints. 274
The issue of prohibitions on religious speech is a complex legal
morass, but fortunately it is a special problem that does not extend to
out-speech by teachers. Viewpoint neutrality in the context of
homosexuality is much easier to demonstrate: a school action or
policy that censors discussions by gay teachers (but not straight ones),
or prohibits discussions about homosexuality (but not other sexual
orientations), would constitute viewpoint discrimination.
A policy that teachers not discuss their private lives, or the topic
of sexual orientation in general, could be crafted and employed in a
viewpoint neutral manner that would not offend the First
Amendment. The school has an interest in class time being used for
teaching the subject at hand, as well as in avoiding controversial and
intimate discussions in a forum designed for conveying a certain
curriculum. However, schools should be required to keep those
policies viewpoint neutral, applying to all types of private revelations
and to all teachers, not just the gay ones.275
First and foremost, a discriminatory speech policy would "cast a
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom," which First Amendment law
has long disfavored.276 Despite the frequent judicial emphasis on the
state's heightened need to curb certain freedoms in the public school
context,277 the First Amendment's traditional loathing of government
interference in free expression based on the viewpoint expressed is
too fundamental to be left vulnerable to school administrators
uncomfortable with homosexuality or fearful of potential controversy.
For a school board wishing to avoid discussions about homosexuality
in school-sponsored forums, crafting a policy that achieves that goal
while remaining viewpoint neutral will be difficult. Asking teachers
to avoid all discussion of their personal lives and refuse responses to
273. C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 170 (3d Cir. 1999), affd en banc by an
equally divided court, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).
274. Id. at 170-71. However, the court held that viewpoint neutrality is not required
under Hazelwood. Id.
275. See Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1286 (D. Utah 1998)
("Because the restrictions imposed ... only targeted speech concerning homosexual
orientation and not heterosexual orientation, the restrictions are properly considered
viewpoint restrictions.").
276. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (noting that "the First
Amendment... does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom").
277. See supra note 56 (discussing special role of teachers in society).
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all questions may be unrealistic or unenforceable. But that is as it
should be; government regulations in the area of free expression must
be drawn with "narrow specificity" in order to avoid chilling free
expression of all citizens-even teachers.278  Protecting these most
fundamental freedoms in the context of public education has never
been easy, but it remains vitally important. "That they are educating
the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the
free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes. 2 79
Courts can impose a procedural safeguard to encourage
viewpoint neutrality by requiring that teachers have reasonable
advance notice of what speech is prohibited. Advance notice is
important, first, because of our long tradition of viewing with
suspicion any government action that might "chill" free speech.2 80 If,
as the Supreme Court pointed out in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,281
teachers have reason to fear ad hoc retaliation for their speech in the
classroom without knowing the boundaries they must not cross, the
classroom will cease to be the "marketplace of ideas." '282 Although, as
discussed above, at least one court has interpreted Hazelwood as not
requiring some policy written in advance, this interpretation is
misguided, because Hazelwood dealt with a prepublication
decision.2 83 The due process dimension of Keyishian and its progeny
requires much more concern when a teacher faces discipline for
speech that she did not know was prohibited when she made it, than
when an administrator censors a student publication before it is
published.2"
278. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604 (emphasizing the need for precise, narrowly drawn
regulations targeting free expression).
279. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
280. See supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text (discussing the advance notice
issue).
281. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
282. Id. at 603; see also Melanie Eversley, An Empowering Loss: Resignation Brought
Gay Teacher Peace of Mind, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 31, 1996, at 1B (Gerry Crane
describes the difficulty of going to work after administrators informed him that they knew
he was gay, but had not decided what to do with that information: "It was a very
precarious situation. I wondered if I was going to be allowed to teach ... or if I was going
to be handcuffed and thrown out.").
283. See Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d
Cir. 1994) (dismissing need for clear rules and procedures in advance); see also supra notes
219-22 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Hazelwood).
284. See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text (discussing Keyishian v. Board of
Regents and its disapproval of overbroad restrictions).
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In addition, a clear written policy is the best way a school system
can guard against the kind of post hoc responses to teacher speech
that would expose them to First Amendment suits-not just because
it puts teachers on notice, but because it provides school board
members and administrators with a tool to mediate responses from
parents or other members of the school community. If the Grand
Rapids school board that employed Gerry Crane had a clear written
policy that teachers will not discuss their private lives in the
classroom, that policy could at least have provided a concrete starting
point for responding to the complaints of parents who learned about
Crane's orientation. Such a policy would have given the school board
a concrete answer to reassure parents that Crane's sexuality would
not be allowed to affect his teaching, instead of reacting in a manner
that validated parents' worst fears. 85 By finding for teachers who had
no notice that their classroom comments about homosexuality would
expose them to adverse employment action, courts can encourage
schools to think about these issues beforehand and put their values
into writing, rather than waiting until they are in the midst of an
emotionally charged conflict. In addition, because a school speech
policy must be written with enough specificity that it does not on its
face prohibit conduct protected by the First Amendment,286
encouraging such policies will put administrators on notice that they
cannot censor teachers in a manner that discriminates against the
expression of gay teachers only.
CONCLUSION
Teachers do not, and should not, surrender their constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate."8 7 That
freedom protects their out-speech in the workplace as well as in the
wider community, as long as they are expressing themselves in an
appropriate and nondisruptive manner. Schools should not be
allowed to legitimate private prejudice by enforcing a "heckler's
veto" against gay teachers. Outside the classroom, teachers should be
entitled to make statements about their own sexual orientation as
long as they are not disruptive in the manner proscribed by Tinker.
Inside the classroom, the best way to protect teachers' First
285. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (discussing the story of Gerry
Crane, and his school board's response in the form of an official statement that it would
watch Crane closely).
286. See supra notes 277-80 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of vague
or overbroad speech policies).
287. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969).
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Amendment freedoms and prevent emotional, ad hoc retaliation for
protected speech is for schools to create in advance a narrowly drawn,
viewpoint neutral classroom speech policy.
Important educational policy goals underlie this argument.
Teachers are charged with a sensitive and complicated mission: to
prepare youth for active participation in American society, shaping
their attitudes toward their country and fellow citizens.2 88  It is
inevitable that their actions and utterances will be subject to close
scrutiny. In focusing on whether students are learning values at
school that do not fit exactly with their parents' preferences, however,
it is too easy to forget that schools are first and foremost incubators of
democracy. The state's interest in inculcating values of civility and
maturity in its future citizens extends to teaching "tolerance of
divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed
may be unpopular." '289 The students in Wendy Weaver's and Gerry
Crane's classrooms surely learned a lasting and negative lesson when
they watched administrators bow to community pressures and force
good teachers from their jobs. Those students have not been well
prepared by their public schools to function in a wider society that
includes many gay members.
EVA DuBUISSON*
288. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979) ("[A] teacher serves as a
role model for ... students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their
perceptions and values. Thus, through both the presentation of course materials and the
example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward
government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities."); see also Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating that "[public education] is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values ... and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment").
289. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) ("These fundamental values
of 'habits and manners of civility' essential to a democratic society must, of course, include
tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be
unpopular."); see also W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (holding
that it is even more important to protect the free expression rights of teachers, in order to
teach students the importance of those rights).
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